The spring house price rally of 2016 shows signs of weakness because buyers can’t afford high house prices despite very low mortgage interest rates. Most housing analysts predicted a robust spring rally with increasing home sales and increasing prices. With low unemployment, an improving economy, and budding wage growth, the signs all pointed to a strong spring market. Unfortunately, now that house prices reached the previous peak in many areas, fewer and fewer buyers can afford them. When house prices go up absent an increase in wages -- which they have over the last four years in California -- affordability declines. In simpler terms, if potential buyers don’t make more money, but prices go up anyway, fewer buyers can afford…[READ MORE]

House prices reached the peak of the previous housing bubble, but was this the inflation of a new bubble or a true and durable recovery? The house price rally that began in 1997 climaxed in a financial mania in 2006, the Great Housing Bubble. By definition, a financial bubble is an unsustainable increase in asset prices followed by a crash that wipes out most of the previous increase. Since prices at the bubble's peak defy any fundamental valuation, the "recovery" from a bubble is the crash because the crash restores prices to their fundamental values (often with a downside overshoot). After the housing crash, everyone who paid peak values wanted to see a return to the ridiculous and unjustifiable prices…[READ MORE]

During the housing mania, every house was desirable, so prices inflated everywhere. Unlike the bubble era, today's buyers only want desirable properties or neighborhoods. During the housing mania, lending standards were eliminated and toxic loan products with teaser rates and negative amortization flourished. As a result, anyone could borrow any amount they wished to buy a home anywhere they wanted -- and that's only a slight exaggeration. With liar loans, borrowers and complicit lenders rendered income requirements meaningless. Even transparent lies, like the woman on food stamps claiming $150K+ income, were eagerly funded. Further, the borrower's income stretched to ludicrous levels with teaser rates where the borrower only needed to qualify for some low initial rate rather than the payment…[READ MORE]

Excessive debt-service burdens reduces a borrower’s ability to leverage themselves to buy houses at today’s inflated prices. During the 00s lenders saddled borrowers with excessive loads of debt: housing, car, consumer, student. There were no legal limits to the percentage of borrower income lenders could claim, so lenders provided so much debt that borrowers operated personal Ponzi schemes (borrowed from Peter to pay Paul) to keep their lives afloat. And why not? Homeowners worried very little about their debt loads because their house appreciated in value and served as another breadwinner. As long as debt was cheap, borrowers never needed their own income or savings to repay, and some dispensed with the need for either income or savings and simply…[READ MORE]

Los Angeles County Housing Market Report: May 2016 Historically, properties in this market sell at a 9.5% discount. Today's discount is 16.7%. This market is 7.2% undervalued. Median home price is $521,600 with a rental parity value of $624,800. This market's discount is $103,200. Monthly payment affordability has been improving over the last 3 month(s). Momentum suggests improving affordability. Resale prices on a $/SF basis declined from $417/SF to $416/SF. Resale prices have been falling for 1 month(s). Over the last 12 months, resale prices rose 7.6% indicating a longer term upward price trend. Median rental rates increased $0 last month from $2,666 to $2,666. The current capitalization rate (rent/price) is 4.9%. Rents have been rising for 12 month(s). Price…[READ MORE]

With house prices high relative to income, many fear lenders inflated a new housing bubble to bail them out from the old one. Home shoppers recoil at today's home prices. Years ago people reveled in high home prices, often buying for fear of being priced out or for greed to capture home-price appreciation; however, high home prices no longer excite buying frenzies since the housing bust. Plus, lenders won't enable buyer foolishness any more. So now when home prices go up, people worry about whether or not prices will crash again -- and with good reason. If mortgage interest rates rise significantly, lenders don't have affordability products to cushion the payment shock, so sales will crumble, and if rates remain…[READ MORE]

Most people who defaulted on their mortgages couldn't afford to pay off the debt. They chose when to default, but the default was unavoidable. No accepted definition of strategic default exists. Lenders attempted to define a strategic defaulter as any borrower who is capable of making a payment and chooses not to. On the surface that sounds reasonable, but that definition misses a very important distinction: Some people chose to default because they know they can’t afford the payments long term, and they are merely choosing the timing of the inevitable. The only thing strategic about the default is the timing, not whether or not they will lose the home. I prefer the distinction between ruthless default and accelerated default.…[READ MORE]

Development impact fees erode the value of raw land, but the fees are not so high as to present a barrier to new home construction at entry-level prices. A recent article from a noted real estate industry source cited development impact fees as a hindrance to development of entry-level homes. I want to demonstrate why this is not the case. Raw land value Most people view raw land as a cost input similar to concrete, lumber, or labor. While raw land certainly costs builders money, the price of raw land does not behave anything like those other cost inputs. Large scale scaffolding companies are needed for big projects. High usage of scaffolding has led to a higher number of scaffolding…[READ MORE]

Wealthy real estate investors will move their money out of ultra-high-end properties when better investment opportunities become available. The only segment of the housing market that wasn't impacted significantly by the housing bust was ultra-high-end real estate. But that may not hold true in the future. What defines ultra-high-end varies by location, but in general these are houses not subject to large mortgages, often purchased completely in cash. Ultra-high-end homes are not purchased by working class people toiling to pay off a mortgage, so changes in mortgage terms and rates effect the resale value of these properties less than the financed purchases at lower price points. When lenders "innovate" with mortgage terms, or when traders in the bond market moves…[READ MORE]

Down payment assistance, like other government housing subsidy programs, merely rewards one group of would-be homeowners at the expense of another group, in this instance, low-income savers. Further the criteria for doling out the rewards is capricious. In the post Two strategies for more abundant and less expensive housing, I suggested that subsidizing low-income borrowers with tax credits would boost prices for low-end housing, and as a result, builders would provide more of it, making housing more affordable for everyone. As someone pointed out in the astute observations that day, such a policy discriminates against those who fail to qualify -- and if not structured properly it would. But if housing subsidies harm people, exactly who is hurt, and how…[READ MORE]