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Author Archive: Irvine Renter

Desire, greed, avarice: house prices rose at unprecedented rates because people motivated by greed were enabled by lenders (who were also motivated by greed) to bid prices higher and higher. There is a certain Karmic justice to the idea of the market perishing in fire. Those who were motivated from desire should suffer in direct proportion to the greed to which they succumbed. In fact, all moral hazard problems emanate from this relationship. If people are not punished by this behavior, it is magnified in the next generation as more and more people choose to behave unwisely. In short, each bubble grows bigger than the last because the survivors tell their tales. If you don't believe this is true, take…[READ MORE]

Tax policy and its relationship to housing is a big topic. This post will not be a comprehensive treatise on the subject. I will look at several areas of tax policy and see what incentives they create and how changes in these areas would impact housing prices. This includes three broad areas: ownership taxes and subsidies, debt subsidies, and appreciation taxes. Ownership taxes and subsidies include property taxes, special tax levies, and the impact of proposition 13. Debt subsidies include the home mortgage interest deduction and its relationship to the personal exemption. Appreciation taxes are capital gains and income taxes from the profitable sale of residential real estate. Ownership Taxes and Subsidies Property taxes have long been a source of…[READ MORE]

I do not like government paternalism. When Ronald Reagan came to power and began our 25 year experiment with government deregulation, I thought it was a good idea. It used to really annoy me when I would see paternalistic politicians who believed they knew what was good for me and for society, and that their ideas of right and wrong should be legislated. Government intrusions into the lives of citizens should be kept to a minimum, and citizens should have the right to make their own decisions and live with the consequences. Well, maybe not. I used to believe all of that, but based on what I have witnessed during The Great Housing Bubble, I see good reasons to bring…[READ MORE]

Much of the analysis of the housing bubble has focused on the fundamental measures of price-to-income and price-to-rent. These are valid statistical measures of what the market should do, and they reflect the fundamental valuations to which prices ultimately return. However, debt-to-income ratios are very revealing of the buyer/borrower activity due to kool aid intoxication and irrational exuberance. There was a significant price bubble in residential real estate in the late 1980s crashing in the early 1990s. This coastal bubble was concentrated in California and in some major metropolitan areas in other states, and it did not spread to housing markets nationwide. When comparing this previous bubble to the Great Housing Bubble, the macroeconomic circumstances were different: Prices and wages…[READ MORE]

On January 1, 2008, I wrote a post titled Predictions for 2008. You can go back and review it to see how well I did. As a recap, I would like to share with you a couple of charts from 2008 for Irvine and OC:   Click for larger image Most of the macroeconomic conditions I made in 2008 are still operative, and several of the predictions I made which came true will likely repeat in 2009. These are: 2008 will see the worst single-year decline in the median house price ever recorded One or more of our major financial institutions and one or more of our major homebuilders will fail A severe local recession I predict we will see…[READ MORE]

Our new President will need help to address the problems in the residential real estate financing system that resulted in The Great Housing Bubble. My full proposal is here: Preventing the Next Housing Bubble.pdf. The following is an exerpt from this proposal: The secondary mortgage market was created in the 1970s by the government sponsored entities, Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, and Ginnie Mae. This market was expanded by the creation of asset-backed securities where mortgage loans are packed together into collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). This flow of capital into the mortgage market is a necessary and efficient tool for delivering money to borrowers for home mortgages. This market must remain viable for the continued health of residential real estate markets.…[READ MORE]

There has been plenty of conjecture about the impact of adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) on the future of our housing market. Some people believe that if interest rates remain low that the upcoming ARM resets will not cause many foreclosures. This is wrong. Today's post examines what will happen when these resets occur, and it will demonstrate why this problem is so big.   By now, most of you have seen the ARM reset schedule shown above. But what does it really mean, and why is this a problem? ARMs became very popular in the bubble rally because they allowed people to finance huge sums of money with smaller payments. In time, it became the only viable alternative for financing. There…[READ MORE]

All methods of predicting future price action rely on the same basic premise: prices are tethered to some fundamental value, and although prices may deviate from this value for extended periods of time, prices eventually return to fundamental valuations. This premise has been reinforced by market observation; in fact, many estimates of fundamental value are based on market action. Since many market participants believe in buying and selling based on fundamental values, there is also an element of self-fulfilling prophecy contained therein. The efficient markets theory is based on this idea, and although the behavioral finance theory is needed to explain the wide deviations from fundamentals real-world prices exhibit, both theories share the same notion of an underlying fundamental valuation…[READ MORE]

Regulatory Solutions The regulatory solution proposed herein is simple, yet far reaching. It comes in two parts, the first is to limit the amount lenders can loan to borrowers with a rather unique enforcement mechanism, and the second is to increase the penalties for borrowers who commit mortgage fraud. The following is not in legalese, but it contains the conceptual framework of potential legislation that could be enacted on the state and/or federal level. A detailed discussion of the text follows: Loans for the purchase or refinance of residential real estate secured by a mortgage and recorded in the public record are limited by the following parameters based on the borrower’s documented income and general indebtedness and the appraised value…[READ MORE]

Preventing the Next Housing Bubble The pain of the deflation of a housing bubble cannot be avoided by trying to keep the bubble inflated, or by trying to deflate it slowly. The only way to avoid these problems is to prevent the bubble from inflating in the first place through some form of intervention in the mortgage market. Intervention can take the form of a market-based intervention demanded by investors and ratings agencies, and it can also come about through direct government regulation. Necessary Intervention The regulated free-market system in place at the turn of the millennium allowed the creation of the Great Housing Bubble. Some combination of market-based and regulatory reforms is necessary to prevent the same circumstances that created the…[READ MORE]


Monthly Housing Report



In Memoriam: Tony Bliss 1966-2012